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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. IS THE COMMISSION'S FINDING, THAT LESIA KNOWLTON'S 
INJURIES WERE MORE LIKELY THE RESULT OF PRE-EXISTING 
GERD OR ASTHMA THAN THE INHALATION EXPOSURE SHE 
EXPERIENCED ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2000, SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE? 
B. IF THE COMMISSION'S FINDING WAS IN ERROR, WAS LESIA 
KNOWLTON ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
BECAUSE THE CLAIM WAS CONTESTED WITHOUT 
REASONABLE GROUNDS? 
C. SHOULD THIS COURT AWARD COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
ON APPEAL TO CLAIMANT? 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S ISSUES PRESENTED 
ON APPEAL 
A. DID THE COMMISSION ERR IN ITS DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO STRIKE CLAIMANT'S POST HEARING BRIEF 
B. WHETHER THE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE 
IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION 
C. WHETHER THE IIGA IS EXEMPT FROM AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES BY THE COMMISSION 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING, THAT LESIA KNOWLTON'S 
INJURIES WERE MORE LIKELY THE RESULT OF PRE-EXISTING 
GERD OR ASTHMA THAN THE INHALATION EXPOSURE SHE 
EXPERIENCED ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2000, WAS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
In her Opening Brief, Lesia Knowlton described the uncontroverted facts 
submitted to the Referee establishing: (1) her exposure to chemical fumes, corroborated 
by defense witnesses, (2) the immediate onset of symptoms, (3) medical evidence 
excluding pre-existing asthma, pre-existing GERD, and allergies to account for her 
symptoms following the exposure, (4) the RADS diagnosis confirmed by three (3) 
treating physicians, (5) further confirmation of the RADS diagnosis by eleven (11) 
Methacholine Challenge Tests, (6) proof that Ms. Knowlton met all of the criteria for a 
RADS diagnosis, and (7) corroborating testimony of her exposure, and prior and 
subsequent condition by two (2) defense witnesses and sixteen (16) witnesses called by 
the Claimant that the Referee admitted gave credible testimony. The Claimant also set out 
numerous deficiencies in the testimony of defense experts, Dr. Stephen Munday and Dr. 
Craig Beaver, including reliance on facts not supported in the record. 
The Appellant's Opening Brief set out uncontroverted facts, including admissions 
by defense experts, which established the Claimant's case. The RespondentiCross-
Appellants' brief does not contradict or refute those facts. This Court discussed the 
treatment of uncontroverted facts by the Industrial Commission in Pier storff v. Gray's 
Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 447, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937) cited by Justice Bistline in dissent 
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in Neufeld v. Browning Ferris Industries, 109 Idaho 899, 712 P.2d 600 (1985). The Court 
in Pierstorff declared: 
"The rule applicable to all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of 
an action, is, that either a board, court, or jury must accept as true the positive, 
uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently 
improbable or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or 
trial." Pierstorff at 447, Neufeld at 904. 
As Justice Bistline noted in Neufeld, supra, at 907: 
"In Wynn v. J.R. Simplot, 105 Idaho 102, 103,666 P.2d 629, 630 (983), this 
Court in a 4-1 decision reversed the Industrial Commission, stating: "The 
uncontradicted evidence is contrary to the Industrial Commission's finding that 
claimant's symptoms were not caused by a ruptured disc." Because the 
Commission made findings inconsistent with and unsubstantiated by 
uncontroverted evidence, this Court reversed its denial of benefits to the 
claimant. " 
The Claimant will rely upon her Opening Brief with respect to the evidence, legal 
analysis and factual argument of these issues. This brief will therefore address the 
Respondent/Cross-Appellants' Additional Issues raised on appeal. 
II 
THE COMMISSION'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
CLAIMANT'S POST HEARING BRIEF WAS NOT ERROR 
The Defendants argue that J.R.P. 11(A) which states that "no brief in excess of 30 
pages, exclusive of any addendum or exhibit, shall be filed without the Commission's 
prior approval," limits the Claimant's opening and reply brief to a total of 30 pages, taken 
together. The Defendants argue that the Rule is clear and unambiguous in this regard, and 
therefore the Referee erred by denying its' motion to strike Ms. Knowlton's Post-Hearing 
Reply Brief. In her objection to the Defendant's motion, Ms. Knowlton correctly pointed 
out that the Rule refers to a "brief," not "briefs" and the Rule specifically allowed the 
Claimant to file two briefs, an opening brief and a reply brief. 
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The word "brief', not "brief~", is used in explaining the allowed pages. The rule 
states in pertinent part: "No briefin excess of30 pages ....... ". Under the Defendant's 
construction, the rule would not limit each "brief' to 30 pages, it would limit all brieA to 
30 pages. The Defendant's interpretation could also be construed that all briefing, 
Defendants' and Claimants, is limited to 30 pages. As such, the claimant's 30 page brief 
would preclude any response by the Defendants because all the "briefing" was then 
completed. 
The Defendants claim that the Rule is clear and unambiguous, but then resort to 
the use of the "Comment" as a means of construction of the rule. This presupposes that 
the rule is ambiguous and therefore must be interpreted by reference to additional 
information. In fact, the Rule is not ambiguous, but only becomes ambiguous when the 
Defendant attempts to use the "Comment" to supplement it. The Comment is not 
intended to be a method of contradicting the clear wording of the rule, but to advise the 
claimant and Defendant to avoid duplication and redundancy in their arguments. 
Moreover, the words in the Comment i.e. "Subsection A limits briefing to 30 
pages" is not consistent with the Defendants' tortuous construction. The word briefing is 
both "singular" and "plural" as used in the Comment. In other words, the word 
"briefing" can mean the claimant's briefmg (either the initial brief or the reply brief, or 
both). It can mean the Defendant's briefing (Defendant's only brief). It can refer to all of 
the briefs, both Claimant and Defendant. To torture the words to support a conclusion 
that it must mean the claimant is limited to only a total 0/30 pages for both of its briefs, 
renders the word "reply" (as used in the rule to describe the right of each party to respond 
to the others brief) meaningless. The Defendants' construction would allow the claimant 
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to put nothing in its initial brief, leaving the Defendant with nothing to "reply" to. The 
Rule intended to have the claimant fully set forth its case, the Defendant to attempt to 
rebut the same, and for the claimant to reply to the Defendant's attempted rebuttal. 
Defendant's construction would emasculate the intention of the words "reply" when 
referring to the parties' briefmg. 
These Defendants made these same arguments in Marlene Griffith v. Firstbank 
Northwest, Fremont Compensation, and Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association, I.C. 
1999-031588, decided by the Industrial Commission on June 3, 2010. In Griffith, these 
Defendants presented a motion to Strike Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief, identical 
to the one filed in this case. The Referee denied the Defendants' Motion, stating: 
"Defendants' MotionlMemorandum to Strike Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply 
Brief is denied. J.R.P. 11(A) limits each individual brief to 30 pages, absent prior 
Commission approval. Thus, for purposes of J.R.P. 11, the length of Claimant's 
10-page reply brief is considered separately from that of Claimant's 30-page 
opening brief. Claimants are allowed more briefing opportunity than defendants 
because claimants bear the burden of proof .... Defendants' MotionlMemorandum 
to Strike Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief is denied." Id at 3-4. 
The Industrial Commission adopted the Referee's findings in its Order. The 
decision by this lower tribunal is not binding on this Court, and does not prevent the 
Defendants from raising the same issue here on appeal. But the analysis of the Referee 
and Order of the Commission demonstrate that if the Rule is in fact clear and 
unambiguous, as argued by the Defendants, then it clearly and unambiguously does not 
support the Defendants' argument. 
In addition to the foregoing, the Defendants have also failed to present any 
evidence or even made an argument that they were somehow prejudiced by reason of the 
alleged error of the Referee. They prevailed before the Industrial Commission, and 
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neither the Findings of Fact, nor the Commission's Order indicate that the length or 
number of the briefs submitted affected the decision in any respect. I.R.C.P. Rule 61 
states that: 
"The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in 
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 
No error was made by the Referee in denying the Defendants' Motion to Strike. 
But even if there was, it was harmless error and therefore should be disregarded by this 
Court. 
ill 
THE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER 
THE IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION 
The Defendant Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association (IIGA) makes the argument 
that: "while the Commission certainly has the authority to establish the amount of any 
such benefits, it lacks the authority to require the Association to make payment therefor." 
Resp. Brief, p. 40. This Defendant also contends that "the issue of whether Claimant has 
exhausted all claims under any other policies or sources of reimbursement (such as 
Medicare) arises under the Act, not the worker's compensation statutes, and the 
Commission therefore lacks jurisdiction to assess liability to the Association for any 
underlying expenses." Resp. Brief, p. 43. These contentions are not supported by Idaho 
law. 
As the cornerstone of its argument, the IIGA cites Bantz v. Minnesota Insurance 
Guaranty Association, 124 Idaho 780, 864 P .2d 618 (1993). That case involved an out of 
state Insurance Guaranty Association. In Bantz, the Court adopted the Minnesota 
Insurance Guaranty Association's (MIGA) argument that an Idaho Court did not have 
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jurisdiction to determine whether a claim was covered by MIGA because of the 
applicability of Minnesota law specific to that issue. The Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
" ... Minnesota Statutes §60C.IO [which] provides that 'the board shall determine 
whether claims submitted for payment are covered claims.' Other provisions in 
the Minnesota Code provide for an appeal if the boar rejects a claim. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that unless the statutory procedure for 
submitting claims is followed, MIGA is not liable to pay the claim ... In this case, 
Bantz has not submitted her claims to the board." Id at 787. 
The IIGA relies on this reasoning even though the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Act 
does not include the statutory provision found in the Minnesota Act. In Idaho, the board 
is not tasked with the responsibility to "determine whether claims submitted for payment 
are covered claims." Instead, a "covered claim" is statutorily defined under Idaho law by 
I.C. §41-3605(7) which states, in pertinent part: 
"'Covered claim' means an unpaid claim, including one for unearned premiums 
submitted by a claimant, which arises out of and is within the coverage and is 
subject to the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this act applies 
issued by an insurer, if such insurer becomes an insolvent insurer after the 
effective date of this act." 
This important statutory difference between the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Act 
and the Minnesota Insurance Guaranty Act invalidates the IIGA's argument. Moreover, 
this interpretation of the law is consistent with the Industrial Commission's Findings and 
Conclusions of Law in the Griffith case cited above, in which it noted: 
"45. Alleged statutory limitations on the Association's liability. Claimant 
correctly asserts that Idaho Code §41-3608(1)(a)(i) requires the Association to 
pay: "The full amount of a covered claim for benefits under a worker's 
compensation insurance coverage." However, the extent of a covered claim is 
statutorily defined. Defendants argue that Idaho Code §41-3605 legislatively 
exempts the Association from liability for any amount due any other insurer, such 
as Claimant's private health insurer .... 
46. Defendants' assertion ignores one of the tenets of St. Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center v. Edmundson, 130 Idaho 108,937 P.2d 420 (1997), 
that Idaho Code §72-432(1) does not require direct payment to a health care 
provider. "The Commission awarded benefits to the injured worker, not payment 
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to the provider." Edmundson at 111,937 P.2d at 423. In the present case, 
Claimant's private health insurer is not a party in this proceeding. Claimant - not 
Claimant's health care providers or private health insurer - is entitled to payment 
of medical benefits for medical expenses resulting from her industrial accident. 
Thus the provisions ofIdaho Code §41-3605(7) do not reduce Defendants' 
obligations for medical benefits otherwise due Claimant." Id at 16-17. 
The IIGA also argues that Idaho Code §41-3612 requires Ms. Knowlton to 
exhaust her rights under other insurance policies that cover her medical bills. But this 
argument is presented without evidence and only as a hypothetical. While the record 
shows that Ms. Knowlton qualified for Social Security Disability, there is no evidence 
that her medical bills were or are being covered by any third party insurer. Nor does the 
IIGA cite any evidence that Ms. Knowlton's medical bills have been or will be covered 
by other medical insurance. The IIGA could have presented evidence to the Referee on 
the subrogation issue prior to submitting the case for decision. As the Court noted in 
Idaho State Insurance Fundv. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 980 P.2d 556 (1999): 
"Pursuant to I.C. § 72-201 and § 72-707, it is clear that the legislature intended, in 
order for the worker's compensation law to achieve its purpose of providing sure 
and certain relief for injured workers and their families, that all claims, issues and 
civil actions relating in any manner to the injury of a worker, whether procedural 
or substantive, be decided under the worker's compensation act by the 
Commission. This would also include subrogation issues, I.C. § 72-223(3) ... " 
The IIGA also made this argument to the Industrial Commission in Griffith, 
which pointed out that such medical expenses are typically excluded from private health 
insurance policies. 
"47. Defendants also assert that Claimant must exhaust coverage under 
any other applicable insurance policy, including her private health insurance 
policy, and that the Association's liability is reduced by that amount. Defendants 
rely upon Idaho Code §41-3612 ... 
48. Defendants' assertion ignores the fact that to the extent Claimant's 
medical expenses are the result of her industrial accident, she may very well have 
no viable claim for such expenses under her private health insurance 
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coverage ... Treatment for work-related injuries is commonly excluded under 
private health insurance policies." Id at 18. 
IV 
TIlE ASSOCIATION IS NOT EXEMPT FROM AN AWARD 
OF ATTORNEYS FEES BY TIlE COMMISSION 
Ms. Knowlton has requested an award of attorneys fees and costs for her 
representation before the Commission at all stages of this proceeding under Idaho Code § 
72-804. The Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association argues that Idaho Code §41-3605(7) 
bars a claim for attorneys fees because it provides that a "covered claim" shall not 
include any amount awarded as "punitive or exemplary damages." The Defendant 
contends that "The Worker's Compensation Act specifically designates attorney fees as 
"punitive costs," which was seemingly affirmed by this Court in Idaho State Insurance 
Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 980 P.2d 556 (1999)." Resp. Brief, p. 48 
Contrary to the Defendant's claim, attorney fees awarded under the Worker's 
Compensation Act are not "punitive costs." In Van Tine, supra, the Court did not refer to 
'attorney fees' as 'punitive costs,' but listed them separately. 
"We believe that the legislature did not intend for a worker to be able to bring a 
bad faith tort action against his employer's surety in courts of general jurisdiction, 
but rather that a worker could receive attorney fees and sometimes punitive costs 
if the employer or surety acts unreasonably." Id at 909 
As with all of the other arguments made by the Idaho Insurance Guaranty 
Association in this case, this argument as well was made to and rejected by the Industrial 
Commission in the Griffith case. The Commission provided the following legal analysis 
to support its decision: 
" .. .Idaho Code §6-1601(9) provides: "Punitive damages' means damages 
awarded to a claimant, over and above what will compensate the claimant for 
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actual personal injury and property damage, to serve the public policies of 
punishing a defendant for outrageous conduct an of deterring future like conduct." 
93. It is noteworthy that none of the terms "damages," "punitive damages," or 
"exemplary damages" appear in Idaho Code §72-804. "An award of attorney fees 
in workers' compensation cases must be deemed compensation to the injured 
employee and not as a penalty against the employer or surety." Dennis v. School 
District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 98, 15 P.3d 329, 333 (2000), citing Mayo v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161, 457 P.2d 400 (1969). Idaho Code §41-
3605(7) does not exempt the Association from Idaho Code §72-804. 
94. The question remains whether the Association qualifies as a "surety" pursuant 
to Idaho Code §72-804. Idaho Code §41-3608(1)(c) provides that the Association 
shall: 
( c) Be deemed the insurer to the extent of its obligation on the covered claims and 
to such extent shall have all rights, duties, and obligations of the insolvent insurer 
as if the insurer had not become insolvent including, but not limited to, the right 
to pursue and retain salvage and subrogation recoverable on paid covered claim 
obligations. " 
95. Thus the Association is deemed Claimant's insurer for purposes of Idaho 
Code §72-804 and is not exempt from an award of attorney fees for unreasonable 
conduct." Id at 34-35. 
v 
LESIA KNOWLTON SHOULD BE AWARDED 
HER ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Ms. Knowlton has requested an award of her attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41 and on the grounds that the employer and surety have contested and 
refused to pay Ms. Knowlton's claim without reasonable grounds pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 72-804. In its cross-appeal, the Defendant Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association has 
done nothing more than rehash all of the same arguments that were made in its defense of 
the Griffith case, and rejected by the Industrial Commission in its written decision on 
June 3, 2010. The Griffith case, decided by a lower tribunal, is not binding precedent 
upon this Court. However, it is persuasive authority and the legal analysis adopted by the 
Industrial Commission in that case is sound and based upon existing Idaho Supreme 
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Court case precedent. When the RespondentiCross-Appellant's brief was filed, this 
Defendant was certainly aware, not only of the similarity of the arguments, but of the 
recent adverse decision in the Griffith case on the identical issues, including its reasoning 
and citation to binding precedent, which should have guided its submission here. At the 
very least, the Defendant should have attempted to distinguish the Idaho Supreme Court 
cases cited by the Industrial Commission in support of its decision. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant-Claimant prays that this Court reverse the decision of the Commission 
and remand the case to the Commission accordingly. She also requests an order awarding 
attorney's fees against the Respondents for unreasonably denying workers' compensation 
at every stage of the proceedings, including this appeal 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of June, 2010. 
(jt,. "2) f.J . 
Chri T T .• ~ 
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